

direction, the annual per capita consumption of fish in Canada has been estimated at not more than 20 pounds, a low figure considering Canada's position as a fish-producing country.

International Problems.—The chief international fisheries problem is the question of the rights of the United States, whose fishermen were granted, by the Treaty of Versailles, certain privileges in the Canadian inshore fisheries. Losing these by the war of 1812, the United States after 1818 surrendered all but their liberty to call at Canadian ports for shelter, wood, water, or to make repairs, and to fish around the Magdalen islands and on the north shore of the gulf of St. Lawrence from Point Joli eastward, and to dry and cure their fish in any of the unsettled bays on this portion of the north shore. In the years 1854-1866, the Reciprocity Treaty set at rest questions of interpretations to be placed on certain parts of the Treaty of 1818. The former treaty provided for the free admission into either country of the fish products of the other, and the fishermen of each country were allowed to fish in Atlantic territorial waters of the other, with the exception of specified rivers and other grounds.

In 1871, the Treaty of Washington revived the fishery provisions of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, and provided for a commission to determine the compensation to be paid by the United States to Great Britain as the difference in the value of the concessions mutually granted. This commission sat at Halifax in 1877, handing down the "Halifax Award," the amount of which was \$5,500,000. In 1885, however, the United States terminated the fisheries articles of this treaty, and a period of disagreement followed. A settlement was negotiated in 1888, when the plenipotentiaries of the two nations agreed to the "Unratified Treaty of 1888," under which United States fishing vessels were granted, without fee, annual licenses authorizing them to purchase provisions and outfits in Canadian ports, to trans-ship catches and to ship crews. Out of this treaty grew the so-called *modus vivendi* licenses. Since it was recognized that the treaty could not receive official sanction before the commencement of the fishing season, it was agreed that United States fishing vessels, on paying \$1.50 per registered ton, should receive annual licenses conveying the above privileges. The treaty was rejected by the United States Senate, but Canada continued to issue *modus vivendi* licenses up to 1918, when arrangements were made for reciprocal privileges in the ports of either country. The arrangement was discontinued in the United States on July 1, 1921. The following year the *modus vivendi* licenses were revived in Canada, but the system was terminated on Dec. 31, 1923, and United States fishing vessels are now limited to the provisions of the Treaty of 1818.

On the Great Lakes, also, the more important fishery problems, such as restocking and marketing, are necessarily international in character, and are complicated by the number of state governments interested. Much the same situation has developed in British Columbia, where the sockeye of the Fraser are taken by the canners of Puget sound in quantities that largely exceed the catch of the Canadian canners, and by trap nets and other methods forbidden in Canadian waters. In 1906 an International Commission first discussed the question, while in 1922, prohibition of sockeye fishing in the Fraser for 5 years, with a view to conservation, was recommended by a Parliamentary Commission.

Fishing Bounties.—An important though indirect aftermath of the Washington Treaty remains. By an Act of 1882 (45 Vict., c. 18) for the development of the sea fisheries and the encouragement of boat-building, provision was made for the distribution annually among fishermen and the owners of fishing boats of \$150,000